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Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Limits of
the Legal Method
ROBERT E. Scorr*
According to the overwhelming majority view, promissory estoppel is not an
appropriate ground for legally enforcing statements made during preliminary
negotiations unless there is a "clear and unambiguous promise" on which the
counterparty reasonably and foreseeably relies. Bill Whitford and Stewart Macaulay
were among the first scholars to note the apparent absence of such a promise in the
case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores. Several years ago, after studying the trial record, I
concluded that the best explanation for the breakdown in negotiations was the
fundamental misunderstanding between the parties as to the amount and nature of
Hoffmann's equity contribution to the franchise. After locating and interviewing
Hofflnann, Whitford and Macaulay tell a different story. They view as insignificant the
misunderstanding about the nature of Hofflnann's equity contribution. Rather, they
focus attention on additional statements urging Hoffmann to sell his bakery business
and store. In these later statements, ignored by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, they find
the "missing promise" that they challenged all of us to look for years ago. While I
credit their account, I remain as unconvinced by their story as they are of mine. Thus,
the important question is how scholars could draw such different inferences from the
same basic facts. In this Article, I speculate that the different stories are a product of
our respective methodological commitments: their commitment to a law-and-society
approach to legal issues and mine to a law-and-economics mode of analysis. Those
diverse approaches illustrate the tension between "context" and "theory" and the
inherent paradox of legal analysis: without context, no legal rule can be applied, but
with nothing but context no legal rule can be found. For this reason, I conclude, it is
important for legal academics of every stripe to appreciate the biases inherent in their
methodology of choice and to work to correct for them.
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INTRODUCTION
I learned how to teach Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.' at the
hands of Stewart Macaulay and Bill Whitford. Their casebook was the
first to focus on the "missing promise" as the key issue in determining
whether promissory estoppel was an appropriate ground for assessing
liability against Red Owl Stores for the reliance losses incurred by
Joseph Hoffmann.' The question that they posed was a direct challenge
to the rationale adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in support of
its opinion that a "promise" that supports liability under promissory
estoppel-here Red Owl's representation that $18,ooo was sufficient
capital to secure a franchise-need not be as definite in its terms as a
promise that is the basis of a traditional bargain contract? And, indeed,
the court's opinion seemed to be quite inconsistent with the now-
dominant view of when courts should use the doctrine of promissory
estoppel to protect precontractual reliance. The majority view is
expressed in the oft-quoted opinion of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in R. G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co.: a claim for
promissory estoppel for early reliance requires a "clear and unambiguous
promise; a reasonable and foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the
promise is made; and an injury sustained by the party" who has relied.4
1. 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
2. See I STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRAcTs: LAW IN ACTION,
THE INTRODUCTORY COURSE 398-401 (2d ed. 2003).
3. Id. at 275.
4. 751 F.2d 69, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Ripple's of Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Assocs., 452
N.Y.S.2d 447, 44 (App. Div. 1982)). In denying liability, the court found that "the entire history of the
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My preferred approach to answering Macaulay and Whitford's
challenge to look for the missing promise was to focus instead on quasi-
contract: here, the argument was that Mr. Hoffmann' had conferred a
benefit on Red Owl during the period from January through November
1961 when he opened and then sold his grocery store, and thereafter sold
the bakery business and building and purchased an option on a lot in
Chilton.' All these actions gave Red Owl valuable and beneficial
information as to the kind of franchisee that Hoffmann was likely to be
and the extent of his commitment to the project. Under the prevailing
view, a quasi-contract claim lies either because one party wrongfully
induced the other to confer the benefit in question or had the
opportunity to prevent the other from conferring the benefit by mistake.
This at least put the right question to a court: was Hoffmann wrongfully
induced to provide this benefit to Red Owl or was he a "mere
volunteer"?
Meanwhile, I had begun to research an article on precontractual
agreements focusing on the sea change in the law following the landmark
opinion of Judge Pierre Leval in Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n v.
parties' negotiations made it plain that any promise or agreement at that time was conditional upon
the signing of a written contract." Id. at 79. Plaintiff manifestly cannot make an end run around the
defendant's reservations against undertaking a legal obligation absent a signed contract by
recharacterizing the claim as one of promissory estoppel. Id. at 78-79. Other courts have adopted
similarly stringent requirements for imposing liability for precontractual reliance. See, e.g., Banco
Espirito Santo de Investimento v. Citibank, N.A., No. o3-Civ.-I537, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 23062
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003).
5. The reader should note that Joseph Hoffmann in fact spells his last name with two n's, and it
was so spelled in the trial transcript and in Respondents' Brief to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. See
Transcript of Record, Hoffmann v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., No. 14954 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 1963);
Respondents' Brief, Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d 267 (No. 147). The majority opinion of Justice Currie in the
Supreme Court misspelled his name and the misspelling has remained ever since. See Hoffman, 133
N.W.2d 267.
6. See ROBERT E. Scort & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRAcT LAW AND THEORY 295-96 (4th ed. 2007).
7. See Bailey v. West, 249 A.2d 414, 418 (R.I. 1969). For discussion, see Scorr & KRAUS, supra
note 6, at 4-12.
8. The court in Bailey summarized the well-established test for determining whether the benefit
that was conferred by the plaintiff on the defendant constitutes an "unjust enrichment":
There is a long line of authority which has clearly enunciated the general rule that ... if a
performance is rendered by one person without any request by another, it is very unlikely
that this person will be under a legal duty to pay compensation."
The Restatement of Restitution, § 2 (1937) provides: "A person who officiously confers
a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor." Comment a in the above-
mentioned section states in part as follows:
" .. . Policy ordinarily requires that a person who has conferred a benefit ... by way of
giving another services ... should not be permitted to require the other to pay
therefor, unless the one conferring the benefit had a valid reason for so doing. A
person is not required to deal with another unless he so desires and, ordinarily, a
person should not be required to become an obligor unless he so desires."
249 A.2d at 417-18 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (citing iA ARTHUR LINToN CoRBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTs § 234).
861March 2oo]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Tribune Co.9  Leval held that parties will have made a "binding
preliminary commitment" when they have agreed on certain terms even
though other terms are left open and when the best inference from their
negotiations is that they have agreed to bargain in good faith over the
open terms.'0 In cases following Tribune, a number of courts began to
relax the knife-edge character of the common law by which parties are
fully bound or not bound at all. Instead, a new default rule emerged
holding that parties to such a preliminary understanding "accept a
mutual commitment to negotiate together in good faith in an effort to
reach final agreement."" Thereafter, if the parties could not ultimately
agree on a final contract, they were free to abandon the deal." In the
course of analyzing this trend toward enforcing certain preliminary
agreements, my coauthor Alan Schwartz and I studied a random sample
of io8 cases litigated between 1999 and 2003 that directly presented the
issue of recovery for precontractual reliance.' Our goal was to dis-
aggregate the precontractual-reliance cases by categorizing the various
commercial patterns revealed in the cases and their legal consequences.
Thirty cases in the sample raised the issue of reliance in the context
of ongoing negotiations where the theory of liability was based on
promissory estoppel, thus implicitly conceding that the parties had yet to
reach any agreement at all. 4 The courts denied liability in eighty-seven
percent of these promissory estoppel claims." Based on the cases in the
sample, I surmised that many lawyers were bringing suits claiming
reliance on preliminary negotiations based on a theory of promissory
estoppel, but because they lacked evidence of a "clear and unambiguous
9. 670 F. Supp. 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
so. Id. Currently, the Leval framework has been followed in at least thirteen states, sixteen
federal district courts, and seven federal circuits. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual
Liability and Preliminary Agreements, I2o HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 n.7 (2007).
ii. Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 498. When the parties have agreed upon everything important-
when they have made what courts call a "fully binding agreement"-the court will enforce the
disappointed promisee's expectation interest. See, e.g., Gorodensky v. Mitsubishi Pulp Sales (MC) Inc.,
92 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). When the question involves ongoing negotiations, such as
occurred in Hoffman, the focus is on so-called "binding preliminary commitments," where the parties
have left important matters for further negotiation. See Tribune, 670 F. Supp. at 498.
12. A federal court recently referred to this way of enforcing certain kinds of precontractual
reliance as the "modern trend in contract law." See Beazer Homes Corp. v. VMIF/Anden Southbridge
Venture, 235 F. Supp. 2d 485, 491 (E.D. Va. 2003).
13. We began the project in the spring of 2004 by examining all public databases for preliminary
negotiation and preliminary agreement cases proceeding under the following theories of liability:
promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, implied contract, definiteness, and intent to be bound. This
initial search returned 28o cases. We then selected every other case to produce a sample of 140 cases.
In thirty-two of those cases, precontractual reliance was only peripherally relevant to the outcome.
That produced the final sample of so8 cases. The sample represented twenty-nine state jurisdictions,
nineteen federal district courts, and seven federal courts of appeal. we subsequently published our
findings in Schwartz & Scott, supra note so.
54. Id. at 692-93.
r5. Id. at 671-72.
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promise," as required by cases such as R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn &
Hardart Co., they would almost always lose. For me, the irony was that
meanwhile an entire new body of law had emerged enforcing certain
"preliminaries" that seemed to offer these parties a viable theory on
which they might have predicated their claims. Given the earlier
skepticism of Macaulay, Whitford, and others about the doctrinal
integrity of the rationale of the court in Hoffman," and the fact that the
case was not being followed in other jurisdictions,' I resolved to study
the trial record and the appellate briefs of the parties. In the process, I
hoped to find some answers to two key questions: What explained the
rather bizarre behavior of Red Owl Stores in not simply breaking off
negotiations if, in fact, they were reluctant to go forward with Hoffmann
as a franchisee? And, would the answer to that question provide an
alternative and more defensible doctrinal basis for the opinion of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court?
My efforts convinced me that the best inference to be drawn from
the record was that the breakdown in the negotiations between Joseph
Hoffmann and Red Owl officials was primarily attributable to a
fundamental misunderstanding between the parties as to the amount and
nature of Hoffmann's capital contribution to the franchise operation.
This misunderstanding cast considerable doubt on the meaning of
Hoffmann's statement to Ed Lukowitz, Red Owl's agent, that "I got-
approximately eighteen thousand dollars. Will this put me in a bigger
operation or won't it?"' The meaning of that statement is central to the
case because the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Lukowitz's reply-
that there would be no problem with that level of investment-was the
grounds for imposing promissory liability.20 Thus, evidence that the
parties never had a shared understanding of what that statement meant
would seriously undermine the court's rationale. The Red Owl
representatives appeared to mean that Hoffmann would have to
contribute equity of at least that amount, and Hoffmann, on the other
hand, clearly was focusing on how much cash he would put into the
16. 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984).
17. A number of scholars have noted the weak doctrinal basis for the Hoffman decision, in
particular the absence of a finding that Red Owl officials made any specific promise to Hoffman. See,
e.g., CHARLEs FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 24 (1981) (stating that Hoffman is best explained as liability
for negligent misrepresentation); Mark P. Gergen, Liability for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. I, 34-36 (1990) (same); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section go,
101 YALE L.J. iiI, 143 (199).
I8. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing
and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 236-43 (1987) (reviewing the cases and noting that the
Hoffman case was not widely cited or followed by other courts).
19. Transcript of Record, supra note 5, at 86.
2o. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 13 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Wis. 1965).
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transaction, whether borrowed or not." Based on the facts as reported in
the trial record, I reached the conclusion that Mr. Hoffmann was at least
partly responsible for failing to clarify the nature of the contribution he
was required to make, and that failure largely explained his frustration
with the changing nature of the financial requirements that Red Owl
proposed to him.
Bill Whitford and Stewart Macaulay (hereafter Bill and Stewart)
have written an excellent article that offers an alternative view of the
case.23 As they suggest, we have different perspectives on the outcome of
the litigation. They read the trial transcript as supporting a finding of
promissory estoppel liability. My reading of the same transcript
convinces me that the misunderstanding over the nature of Hoffmann's
capital contribution undermines any promissory estoppel claim. But
although there are important differences between our stories,
fundamentally we do not disagree about the "facts" of the case as
revealed in the record, the briefs of the respective parties, or the opinion
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Rather, we disagree about what
legitimate inferences can be drawn from those facts." In their view, the
misunderstanding about the nature of Hoffmann's equity contribution
was insinificant (perhaps even a litigation ploy advanced by Red Owl
Stores). 2 Rather, they focus their attention on the additional statements
made by Ed Lukowitz in October urging Mr. Hoffmann to sell his bakery
business and store." In these later statements, ignored by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in its opinion, Bill and Stewart now find the "missing
promise" that they challenged all of us to look for years ago.
21. On cross-examination, Hoffmann was asked, "Was there any discussion. . . at any time as to
how this $r8,ooo was to be made up? That is, was it all to be unencumbered cash or was it partly to be
borrowed cash?" Id. at 167. Hoffmann answered: "I don't believe there was any discussion on that."
Id.
22. My conclusions were reported in a subsequent article, Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl
Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance, 68 Omo ST. L.J. 71 (2oo7). The article was reprinted in
CONTRcTS STORIEs 62 (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007).
23. William C. Whitford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The Rest of the Story,
61 HASTINGs L.J. 8o (2010).
24. See id. at 850.
25. To clarify this point, I begin by accepting the accuracy of the factual statements that Bill and
Stewart recount in their story and that are derived from the trial record and briefs. However, also
important to Bill and Stewart's story is the information gained from (and their evident confidence in)
the interviews with Mr. Hoffmann as he recalled the events of fifty years ago. See id. at 809 n.18. Since
they did not record the interviews, it is impossible for others to judge Hoffmann's answers without
knowing the questions, the question sequence, and the context for answers so as to rule out response
bias or other flaws in the interview methodology. And, in any event. Hoffmann recounts only one side
of the story, and through the lens of time at that. Thus, we must put those conversations on the side of
inference and not fact.
26. See id. at 838-44.
27. See id. at 839-40.
28. Cf id. at 839-41.
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So, what is a reader to make of all this? Bill and Stewart are at pains
to say in their article that it would be a shame if the lesson drawn is that
these exercises in legal archeology are wholly subjective, reflecting only
the biases and ideologies of the legal analyst." They state, and I certainly
concur, that we agree on many points. But we do draw quite different
inferences, and in this companion Article I want to use our respective
attempts to understand this case as an occasion to think about why that is
so. We all bring biases to our work, but I am inclined to think that my
desire to vindicate an earlier expressed viewpoint and their desire to
vindicate Mr. Hoffmann (whom they see as having been wronged by my
account) play only limited roles in shaping our analyses. And certainly
ideology in the narrow sense of political preferences offers no
explanation. After many conversations with Bill and Stewart, good
friends for many years, I know that we share the same set of political
preferences. Rather, I will argue that our inferences are shaped much
more by our methodological commitments: their commitment to a law-
and-society approach to legal issues and mine to a law-and-economics
mode of analysis.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I argue that these
different methodologies lead the analyst to deploy, respectively, either a
bottom-up (or "contextual") approach to a legal problem or a top-down
(or "theoretical") approach to the problem, thus leading the analyst to
focus on quite different sets of facts as salient in any controversy. Part II
traces the two very different conceptions of "justice" that these two
methodologies emphasize; differences that explain the focus on the
"result" of the case on the one hand and the "rule" of the case on the
other. I conclude that both approaches struggle with the inherent
paradox of legal analysis: without context no legal rule can be applied,
but with nothing but context no legal rule can be found. For this reason,
among many others, it is important for legal academics to appreciate the
biases inherent in their methodology of choice and work to correct for
them.
I. SELECTING THE FACTS THAT MATTER
A. Two QUITE DIFFERENT STORIES
Bill and Stewart tell a story in which Joseph Hoffmann is a careful
and cautious young businessman, 30 Ed Lukowitz is an enthusiastic
(perhaps overly enthusiastic) good guy who was looking out for
Hoffmann's interests," and the folks in the home office-the relatively
29. See id. at 849-
30. Id. at 837 39.
31. Id. at 838-4L.
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anonymous "corporate" types-were intent on changing the playing field
owing to their decision to concentrate on placing franchises in larger
markets.32 In this environment, they focus on the statements made by
Lukowitz in mid-October telling Hoffmann "that the only hitch in this
thing" was that he sell the bakery business and building.33 This statement,
rather than the earlier statement in May in which Lukowitz indicated
that Hoffmann's $18,ooo was a sufficient investment,' represents the
missing promise-a promise that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as well
as subsequent analysts, failed to see."
In my article, I told a much different story. For me the key fact was
the May exchange between Hoffmann and Lukowitz concerning the
amount of money that Hoffmann had available to invest in the
franchise." Hoffmann's statement that "I have $18,ooo to invest," the
subsequent financial plans which used that sum as their foundation, and
statements by both parties concerning the nature of Hoffmann's
investment all reflect an ongoing misunderstanding between Hoffmann
and the Red Owl officials as to the precise nature of his investment. As
Bill and Stewart point out, from the beginning Hoffmann only intended
to invest $10,500 of his own money and to secure the balance through a
loan from his father-in-law, while Red Owl officials consistently
emphasized in the various financial statements, signed by Hoffmann, that
he contribute "equity" of at least $18,ooo. 3
The record thus also appears to support a story of ships passing in
the night: The parties never had a mutual understanding about the
meaning of $18,ooo of capital. Red Owl officials testified under oath that
32. Id. at 841-45. The basis for the claim that Red Owl's franchise policy changed is Mr.
Hoffmann's current recollection of a memorandum shown to him by Lukowitz in November 1961 that
was never mentioned in any testimony in the record. See id. at 817-20. Bill and Stewart suggest that
this omission may have been because Red Owl was unable to produce any such memorandum during
discovery, see id., but they fail to explain why Hoffmann's attorney did not bother to ask Hoffmann
about such a crucial piece of evidence about which he could testify firsthand. Moreover, Bill and
Stewart have not explored whether any objective evidence suggests that Red Owl's business model
changed during this time.
33. Transcript of Record, supra note 5, at 133; see also Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 23, at
816-17,837-40.
34. Recall that during this conversation Hoffmann said, "Fellows, you know how much money I
got -approximately eighteen thousand dollars. Will this put me in a bigger operation or won't it?"
Transcript of Record, supra note 5, at 86. And Hoffmann "was assured at that time there would be no
problems." Id.
35. In my earlier article, I note this conversation and mention the "without a hitch" comment, but
I did not (and still do not) attribute to it the same significance as do Bill and Stewart. See Scott, supra
note 22, at 79.
36. In defense of this approach, I should note that this statement was the most salient fact in the
finding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that Red Owl had made a "promise" on which Hoffmann was
justified in relying. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores. Inc., 133 N.'W.2d 267, 274 (W/is. 1965).
37. See Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 834-i5.
38. See Scott, supra note 22, at 80-82.
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they always meant that Hoffmann would have to contribute equity of at
least that amount,39 and Hoffmann clearly was focusing on the cash into
the transaction -whether borrowed or not.40 Framed in this way, the case
turns on which party was responsible for Hoffmann's mistaken
assumption about the meaning of $18,ooo of capital. In resolving that
issue, we should begin with the conclusion of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, supported by the record, that there was no evidence of any bad
faith by Red Owl.4' At most, Lukowitz was careless in his initial
representation that $18,ooo "would not be a problem" because he did not
inquire further as to what Hoffmann meant. But Hoffmann appears to
have been careless as well. Certainly, he could see by September, when
he was handed a proposed financing plan,42 that what he was to
contribute was "equity" of at least $18,ooo. While the cash requirements
for the franchise increased over time, the equity requirements remained
largely fixed and the additional proposals for cash were loans that
Hoffmann was free to repay if he did not need the funds in his grocery
business.43
B. THE DIVIDE BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIETY AND LAW AND ECONOMICS
These two quite different stories rest, as I have suggested, on
inferences drawn from facts on which we agree. The interesting question,
therefore, is not which story is "true," nor even which set of inferences is
closer to the truth. Rather, the key question for legal scholars is what
explains why two sets of experienced contracts scholars-committed to
the scholarly ideal of searching for the truth-would reach such different
conclusions. Not only have we chosen to focus on different facts, but the
authors of both stories tend to discount the inferences on which the
other's story depends. The reason that this is so, I believe, is attributable
to differences between our priors; that is, the preexisting methodological
commitments that separate my analysis on the one hand from Bill and
Stewart's on the other. The shorthand for those differences is expressed
as the divide between "law and society" and "law and economics." This
divide results from fundamentally different conceptions about the role of
law and the relative power of context versus theory as the best means of
39. Transcript of Record, supra note 5, at 310, 417-22.
4o. Id. at 141-44.
41. Hoffinan, 133 N.W.2d at 273.
42. See Transcript of Record, supra note 5, at 103-04 & Ex. 39.
43. Scott, supra note 22, at 91. The trial transcript suggests (to me) that Lukowitz was trying to
mediate between Hoffmann's meager capital assets and the home office's capital requirements. If so,
the question is whether Hoffmann should have been more cautious in nailing down exactly how much
capital he would have to provide prior to buying the grocery store, selling the store, selling his bakery,
buying an option on a lot, etc.
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understanding the relationship between law and legal rules and the
actions of contracting parties."
Analyzing the effects of legal rules on contracting behavior has been
a fruitful source of inquiry for analysts using the techniques of law and
economics.45 By imposing sanctions or granting subsidies, the law gives
contracting parties incentives for desirable behavior. Analyzing the
incentive effects of legal rules thus provides a useful predictive tool both
to explain the legal rules we see and to support a normative critique of
those rules that have undesirable effects. Economic theory, especially the
theory of rational choice, is well suited to analyzing variables-such as
the legal rules governing precontractual liability-that stimulate changes
in the costs of certain behaviors." Thus, this analyst might treat context
variables as exogenous, not because these phenomena are unimportant,
but because her analytical tools do not allow her to say anything
systematic about them. This "parsimonious" approach begins with the
assumption that the principal way law influences the behavior of
contracting parties is in how it affects the costs of that behavior, either
directly through legal sanctions or indirectly by stimulating social
sanctions associated with that behavior.47
44. I have previously discussed this divide in the context of the relationship between law and
social norms. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA.
L. REv. 1603 (2000). The following discussion draws on that analysis. It is important to emphasize that
the methodological categories I am describing are quite broad and ill defined. Some law-and-
economics scholars who begin with theory have sought to test their claims against available evidence,
while some law-and-society scholars, whose views are shaped by experience and context, have sought
to critique the theory on its own terms. Nevertheless, because the divide is methodological, the
participants rarely join issue on particular normative claims. This debate between Bill, Stewart, and
me is thus both an exception to the norm as well as an opportunity for thoughtful reflection on these
broader themes.
45. See, for example, Scorr & KRAus, supra note 6, at 81-84, and sources cited therein.
46. Rational choice theory is the branch of economics that studies how an individual
decisionmaker chooses between competing alternatives. Traditional rational-choice theory usually
assumes that an individual's preferences are consistent over time, and even those traditional models
that incorporate changing preferences do not account for strategic manipulation of one's future
alternatives. Economists and other scholars have recently developed a theoretical structure to analyze
individuals' attempts to control or modify their choices through precommitment or self-command.
This theory describes how individuals limit or manage their future behavior to ensure that they do not
compromise their commitment to a present decision. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ETucs, LAW
AND THE EXERCISE OF SELF-COMMAND, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83 (1984); Thomas C. Schelling,
Self-Command in Practice, Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REV. I (1984);
Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980):
Richard H. Thaler & H. M. Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control. 89 J. POL. EcON. 392 (1981).
47. Social sanctions are powerful mechanisms for informal enforcement of contractual
obligations. These informal enforcement mechanisms derive from one or more of three
complementary sources: (i) the fear of losing expected future dealings with the counterparty, (2) the
threat of loss of reputation with the resulting reduction in future business with other potential
counterparties in the relevant economic and social communities, or (3) an individual taste for
reciprocity. The uneasy relationship between these informal extra-legal sanctions and formal legal
sanctions has been a principal focus of my scholarship for over twenty years. See, e.g., ROBERT E. Scorr
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Law-and-society scholars tend to adopt a bottom-up rather than a
top-down approach to understanding contract law.48 If the goal of the
analyst is to examine the behavior of parties in particular contexts and to
eschew abstraction, prediction, and generalization, then the tools of
social theory and sociological description offer a rich story of the human
experience. From sociology we learn about the existence of social norms:
an alternative, complex regime of social control that interacts with law in
many different ways. From psychology, we learn something about the
relationship between external law and internal values and emotions. We
know that external, material incentives are not the only force that
governs behavior. Rather, behavior is stimulated by complex
psychological reward mechanisms. Moreover, evolutionary psychology
teaches us that there is long term advantage in moral behavior.4 9 Salient
emotional reactions-such as guilt, anger, or empathy-mark as a
"cooperator" one who is able to make credible commitments concerning
her future actions.50
But the verdict is far less clear when it comes to using this more
textured understanding of human experience to improve our ability to
identify precisely when legal liability for reliance costs should be imposed
& PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2oo6); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009);
Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1641 (2003);
Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005 (1987). I
trace my interest in this question directly to the classic paper by Stewart Macaulay, who first studied
systematically the potency of informal mechanisms for contract enforcement. See Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). For a current
effort to harmonize the tension between formal and informal enforcement, see Ronald J. Gilson,
Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in
Theory, Practice and Doctrine (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 389, 20o), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535575.
48. STEWART MACAULAY, JOHN KIDWELL & WILLIAM WHITFORD, CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION, THE
CONCISE COURSE 12 (2d ed. 2003).
49. ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMoTIoNS 5, 11-12,
37 (1988).
5o. Robert Frank argues that moral behavior has its source in the emotions rather than in
"rationality" and reason. Id. at II-12. Beyond the strategic role of endogenous values and preferences,
we have learned from cognitive and social psychology that there are systematic "errors" in human
judgment and decisionmaking reflected in the deviation between empirically observed behavior and
the predictions of rational-choice models of behavior under conditions of uncertainty. Best known to
legal scholars is the "prospect theory" developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. See
generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, &
Amos Tversky eds., 1982). More recently, the normative underpinnings of this research have been
challenged by new studies that show that framing bias by researchers may account for many of the
observed "errors" in human judgment. Thus, behavior that once might have been crudely
characterized as reflecting cognitive errors or biases is better understood as human tendencies to use
adaptive rules of thumb or "smart heuristics" that order human decisionmaking around frequencies
rather than probabilities. See generally GERD GIGERENZER & PETER M. TODD, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT
MAKE Us SMART (1999)-
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in a failed negotiation. The danger in such an environment is that the
analyst will be guided more by the strength of her a priori beliefs in the
relative efficacy of judicial intervention than in the analytical tools that
are deployed. In short, the dilemma remains no different than when it
was first identified by Arthur Leff a generation ago. As Robert Ellickson
has noted, Leff said law and economics is a "desert," and law and society
is a "swamp."5' For more than twenty-five years legal scholars have
searched for the fertile middle ground between economics and the other
behavioral sciences. The search may be noble and important, but the tale
of these two different stories of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores demonstrates
that the end of the journey is not yet in sight.
C. A CRITIQUE OF BOTH AccoUNTS
So, we have two stories-the "found promise" story and the
"missing equity" story. How would analysts from either tradition critique
the other? The law-and-society analyst begins to deconstruct the
''missing equity" story by first conceding the standard analysis from
economic theory that a franchisor will appropriately insist that the
franchisee make a substantial equity contribution to the franchise." As a
matter of theory, Red Owl's apparent insistence that Hoffmann make a
substantial equity contribution to the franchise reflects perfectly
appropriate business judgment.53 The risk in any franchise contract is that
the interests of the parties will be misaligned and, as a consequence, the
franchisee may manage its operation in a manner inconsistent with the
interests of the franchisor.54 Requiring the franchisee to invest his own
capital and then allowing him to retain the profits induces the franchisee
to increase his efforts compared to that of an employee-manager.
Franchisees are disinclined to shirk because their income is directly tied
to their efforts. By requiring the franchisee to contribute a substantial
sum of equity capital, the relationship mitigates agency problems and
promises greater operational efficiencies.
51. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DisPUTEs 147 & n.46
(1991) ("Stanton Wheeler reported that Leff used these metaphors in a casual conversation.").
52. See Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 838-41.
53. Scott, supra note 22, at 91.
54. Id.
55. A widely recognized conflict that arises with excessive debt financing is that the agent may be
motivated to increase the riskiness of his management of the franchise. By "putting all his eggs in one
basket," the agent can gamble with the borrowed funds. If the venture is successful, all the returns in
excess of the fixed debt accrue to the agent. But if the venture fails, the agent shares the loss with his
creditors. Scott, supra note 22, at 91-92. See generally Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise
Contracts, 2 J. CoRP. FIN. 9 (1995); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the
Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 223 (1978). These theoretical claims have been supported by
empirical studies. See, e.g., Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical
Results, 23 RAND J. EcoN. 263 (1992).
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Despite the standard theory, the law-and-society critic might argue
that the particular context of this case shows that it was irrelevant
whether Hoffmann contributed his own equity or borrowed funds. He
was personally liable on any debts he incurred, and, in any case, he was
not "the type of person" who would declare bankruptcy to gain a
discharge from those debts. 6 Thus, for Hoffmann, borrowed funds were
the equivalent of his own equity capital.
A law-and-economics analyst might offer the following rejoinder to
this more contextualized analysis. Accepting for the moment the
speculation that Hoffmann was not the sort to declare bankruptcy,
nevertheless the debts that he contemplated incurring in order to make
up the balance of his capital contribution came from his father-in-law,
Simon Vanden Heuvel." Given the close personal ties that, according to
Hoffmann, characterized his relationship with his father-in-law, 8 it is
inconceivable, should the franchise have failed, that Simon would pursue
collection of his loan-whether it was $7500 or the later, larger sum of
$13,500. Thus, a substantial amount of Hoffmann's equity was a loan that
he felt "morally obligated" to repay should the franchise succeed and
which would likely be forgiven should the franchise fail. Such an
arrangement appears to push a franchisee even further toward a high-
risk business plan: under such a financing arrangement, he loses less on
the down side and needs to make up even more to return his own profit
on the upside.
If the "missing equity" story results in a standoff, what about the
"found promise" story? The law-and-society scholar might support the
"found promise" story by once again providing a richer and deeper
context to explain Hoffmann's behavior. Important facts that help us
understand the impact of Lukowitz's "last hitch" comment are that
Lukowitz knew at the time that he made those statements that Hoffmann
was very reluctant to sell his bakery business and building, as he hoped to
use that income to support his family.59 Under those circumstances, a
reasonable person in Hoffmann's position might understand that a
commitment had been made.
The context evidence is significant, and the law-and-economics
analyst would do well to pause at this point. Is there any rebuttal to the
conclusion that the missing promise has at last been found? One
response lies in the fact that the law governing precontractual reliance
places a strong thumb on the scale of finding no promise, and thus no
liability, when one party relies on statements made by the other in the
course of preliminary negotiations. Recall that the standard legal
56. Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 842.
57. Transcript of Record, supra note 5, at 147; see also id. Ex. 40.
58. See Scott, supra note 22, at 84-88; Transcript of Record, supra note 5, at 333.
59. Transcript of Record, supra note 5, at 133-34.
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doctrine governing promissory estoppel states that it is not sufficient that
the fact finder conclude that it is possible or even probable that the
statement in question constitutes a promise.t Rather, the test is that
there must be "a clear and unambiguous promise; a reasonable and
foreseeable reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; and an
injury sustained by the party" who has relied.6 Conceding the latter two
elements and assuming (after giving Lukowitz's October statements due
weight) that a clear promise is not self-evident on these facts, what
justification is there for insisting on a "clear and unambiguous promise"?
Here the law-and-economics analyst would turn to the undesirable
incentive effects of a rule that finds promissory liability too early in the
negotiation process.
There is an economic justification for the common law preference
for a clear and unambiguous promise in precontractual negotiations. An
economic analysis of liability for relied-upon statements made in
preliminary negotiations is premised on the goal of facilitating parties'
efforts to invest in valuable projects that create a contractual surplus that
they both can share. Courts encourage efficient investment not only by
enforcing contracts but also by refusing to protect the interests of parties
disappointed by the failure to reach agreement. Freedom from liability
for honest expressions of future intention that are later withdrawn
encourages parties to negotiate freely without fear that their initial
expressions of interest will be binding.62 Imposing liability because one
party failed to correct the other's misunderstanding that led to lost
reliance has significant costs, especially if one believes that, ordinarily,
precontractual statements of intention are essentially truthful. Such
statements of intention (economists call these statements "cheap talk")
should not be the basis of liability in the ordinary case.6 Because delay in
reaching a deal is costly to both parties, negotiators have strong
incentives to communicate useful (and truthful) information so as to
either reach a deal as expeditiously as possible or move on to other
opportunities.6 ,
6o. Here, it is important to remind ourselves of the legal definition of "promise" and its
relationship to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 2
(1981) (defining a promise as a manifestation of an intention to be bound that justifies the promisee in
believing a commitment has been made); id. § 90 (section that governs promissory estoppel, beginning,
"A promise. - . ."(emphasis added)).
61. R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 78 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Ripple's of
Clearview, Inc. v. Le Havre Assocs., 452 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449 (App. Div. 1982)); see supra note 4.
62. Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of
Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 494-99 (i999).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (arguing that liability for precontractual statements should be imposed only when one
party misrepresents his relative optimism about the prospects of reaching a deal).
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Accepting for the moment the force of this argument, the law-and-
society analyst might nevertheless respond by noting that there still may
be sound reasons to accept the costs of chilling future negotiations in
order to prevent exploitation of the weak by the strong in particular
contexts. Perhaps a franchise negotiation between a sophisticated
franchisor and a relatively unsophisticated franchisee presents just such a
case.
In the end, therefore, the tension between these alternative
accounts, each reflecting the tradeoff between theory and context, cannot
be readily harmonized. Law incorporates both the general and the
particular. One function of law is to generalize across contexts. But law is
also particular and context specific. Indeed, the common law method
itself illustrates the parallel processes of generalization and
contextualization. Out of the particular facts and circumstances of a
single dispute emerges a rule that is then generalized in its application to
other, similar circumstances. In deciding whether the rule applies to
another case, the common law method requires a further inquiry into the
particular context and circumstances of the new dispute in order to
determine whether the necessary salience exists to support generalization
of the rule.
As a consequence, academic lawyers, more than any other academic
discipline, need to be mindful of the paradox of context: Without context
no legal rule can be applied, but with nothing but context no legal rule
can be found. As legal scholars, we are in the uncomfortable middle
ground between the general and the particular. Law, as applied
behavioral theory, strives to generalize from real-world observations in
order to implement socially desirable changes in real-world behaviors.
Inevitably, this requires the legal analyst to generalize uncomfortably
from the particular observations of the behavioral sciences and to
particularize with equal discomfort the abstractions of economics.
II. THE JUSTICE PARADOX
A. Two CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE
In the preceding Part, I focused on the methodological divide
between theory and context that separates scholars working in law and
economics from those in law and society. In this Part, I turn to a second
area where the focus of the two disciplines diverges: the tension between
the ex ante and the ex post. Law-and-society scholars of contracts
generally take an ex post perspective in adjudication. They view
adjudication, such as the litigation in Hoffman, as an occasion for
identifying and vindicating the preexisting rights of the litigants.& Thus,
66. See MACAULAY, KIDWELL & WHITFORD, supra note 48, at 12, 20-24.
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in their article, Bill and Stewart treat the litigation in Hoffman primarily
as a mechanism for justly resolving a dispute between Joseph Hoffmann
and the Red Owl Corporation. In contrast, law-and-economics analysts
generally take an ex ante, and therefore consequentialist, perspective on
common law adjudication." Economic theorists view adjudication
primarily as a mechanism for creating rules and rights that will provide
incentives for individuals in the future. Judicial decisions are then
evaluated according to whether these prospective effects are socially
desirable.6 8 In contract law, economic analysis asks, for example, how
enforcement of precontractual reliance is likely to affect the behavior of
promisors and promisees in the future. Thus, a key question is whether it
is socially more desirable to encourage or to discourage parties to rely on
statements made during preliminary negotiations.69
This tension between the ex ante and the ex post is more sharply
illustrated by what I call the "Justice Paradox."70 We can illustrate the
paradox by starting with the exclamatory statement that Bill and Stewart
make at the outset of their article in referring to the Hoffman case:
"Justice was done!"7 ' By that they surely mean that the outcome of the
case, in particular the affirmation of the jury verdict in favor of Mr.
Hoffmann, was proper under the law. But this is only a partial
conception of justice. It focuses solely on the outcome of the particular
case (who won /who lost) and not on the effects of the "rule" of the case
as announced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. To understand the
justice paradox, therefore, we must recognize that legal rules that
determine liability have both a distributive function and a behavior
modification function. Not only do they redistribute wealth and
67. Scorr & KRAUS, supra note 6, at 26-27.
68. Id.
69. Scholars continue to debate the merits of the focus on social welfare in contract law. For a
normative discussion of social welfare as the only objective of a contract law between sophisticated
corporate firms, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003). For a criticism of an economic approach and discussion of
collaborative agreements among individuals as the primary purpose of contract law, see Daniel
Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004). For a criticism of Contract Theory
and the Limits of Contract Law on the ground that a contextual interpretation strategy may be
preferred to a formalist interpretation of contracts between firms, see James W. Bowers, Murphy's
Law and The Elementary Theory of Contract Interpretation: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57
RUTGERS L. REV. 587 (2005). Schwartz and I respond to this criticism in our article, Contract
Interpretation Redux. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, I19 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 20o), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1504223 (arguing that both the available
evidence and prevailing judicial practice support the claim that sophisticated parties commonly prefer
judicial interpretations to be made on a limited evidentiary basis, the most important element of which
is the contract itself; but, in any case, since commercial parties' preferences are heterogeneous, any
interpretation rules the state adopts should be defaults).
70. For discussion of the "justice paradox' and its implications for legal scholarship, see generally
Robert E. 5cott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 wM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (s993).
71. Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 8ol (abstract).
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entitlements between the immediate parties, say, Mr. Hoffmann and the
Red Owl Corporation, they also influence the behavior of future parties
who may find themselves similarly situated. The justice of all legal
outcomes under our common law system must therefore be evaluated
from two distinct perspectives: Does the law accomplish justice between
the parties to any particular dispute? We can call this "present justice."
And, does the law appropriately regulate the conduct of other parties
likely to have similar disputes in the future, making it less likely that
similar misfortune will befall others who can learn from the experience
of these litigants? We might call this "future justice."
The paradox arises from two propositions. First, both criteria must
be satisfied in order to achieve a just outcome. Second, these two criteria
of justice are often in opposition. Simply put, you can't always have it
both ways. We aspire to a just society that satisfies the essential
conditions of both present and future justice, and yet we live in a world
that often requires us to choose between one or the other. Viewed this
way, the tension between the law-and-economics and law-and-society
approaches is both understandable and inevitable-the two perspectives
seem committed to incompatible assumptions about the nature of
adjudication.
B. WAS JUSTICE REALLY DONE IN HOFFMAN?
This tension between the ex ante and the ex post is illustrated, but
not resolved, in our current debate over the meaning of Hoffman v. Red
Owl Stores. Accepting the facts as reported by Bill and Stewart, as well
as accepting as truthful and accurate the memories of the events that Mr.
Hoffmann recounts today, one is hard pressed not to agree with Bill and
Stewart at least to the extent that the jury in the case "got it right."72 In
Peter Linzer's words, this may be a case for "rough justice" and not for
doctrinal niceties." But as I have noted above, this conclusion ignores
important conceptions of justice that deserve equal dignity. Thus, the
new information that Bill and Stewart gleaned from conversations with
Mr. Hoffmann does not rescue the opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court and the unhappy effects of the Hoffman "rule" as it has survived
through the years.
Bill and Stewart are critical of my statement that the Hoffman case
is an outlier.74 They assume that I stand by that statement because I
72. Id. at 857. Bill and Stewart actually say at the end of their article that the court "got it right,"
see id., and that is a statement with which I take issue below. A more temperate analysis might support
the jury's verdict but not the court's rationale affirming that verdict. See infra text accompanying note
82.
73. Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001
Wis. L. REv'. 695, 719-2o.
74. See Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 85-5
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believed that there was no promise, and thus, now that they have found
the missing promise, that claim must be incorrect." But here they are
mistaken. My statement that Hoffman was an outlier is not a normative
claim, but rather is a descriptive statement of how the trule" of the case
has fared in other courts. As first reported by Allan Farnsworth 6 and
subsequently supported by the large case sample that Alan Schwartz and
I assembled, the Hoffman case-based on the facts as reported in the
opinion and thus as it has come to be understood-has been either
ignored or rejected in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that
have grappled with the question of precontractual reliance."
C. WHY IS THE DOCTRINE IMPORTANT?
But what harm is there in inviting recovery for precontractual
reliance when it is at another party's "urging or was a foreseeable and
desired response to a strong assurance that a deal would be reached" ? 8
At one level the answer is that no harm is done, as long as the doctrinal
basis for the claim is clear. As I suggested at the outset of this Article, my
instinct in teaching the Hoffnan case through the years (and my
continuing position going forward, accepting as true everything that Bill
and Stewart report) is that the Hoffman "facts" best support a theory of
liability resting in quasi-contract for unjust enrichment. As noted above,
the argument is that Hoffmann conferred a benefit on Red Owl by
providing them valuable information when he purchased and then
operated a grocery store, sold the bakery business and building, and
acquired an option on a lot in Chilton. All these actions gave Red Owl
officials some further indication of the kind of franchisee that Hoffmann
was likely to be and the level of his dedication to the project. To be sure,
quasi-contract claims then require proof that the defendant specifically
and wrongfully induced that benefit: "it must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean
illegally or unlawfully."79 Thus, the key issue is whether Hoffmann was
"wrongfully" induced to provide a benefit to Red Owl either because
Red Owl officials' inducements were opportunistic or because these
same officials failed to correct Hoffmann's evident misunderstanding.
But is it not just academic sophistry to insist on doctrinal integrity in
judicial opinions? Here my answer is no. This is where the considerations
of future justice become salient. The doctrines governing precontractual
75. See id.
76. See Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 236-43.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
78. Whitford & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 855-56.
79. First Nati1 Bank of St. Paul v. Rainier, 311 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Minn. 1981): see also Fimnon v.
Kenroc Drywall Supplies, Inc., No. C7-o'-1588, 2003 Minn. App. Lexis 311r (Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2003).
So. See supra text accompanying notes 62-65-
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liability are undergoing rapid and dynamic change. What we learn from
the cases is that courts rarely impose promissory estoppel liability based
on one party's reliance on the other's statements during ongoing
negotiations."' But at the same time, many state and federal courts in the
United States have been developing an alternative theory of
intermediate liability premised on a finding of preliminary agreement.
Bill and Stewart appear somewhat dismissive of this trend as a substitute
for promissory estoppel, perhaps because they see recovery on this
ground as being too limited. They suggest, for example, that the key
conditions for finding a binding preliminary commitment (at least as I
have previously outlined them8') would not apply to the Hoffman case.84
But here I believe they are mistaken, perhaps because in previous work I
have been insufficiently clear about the nature of this new theory of
liability.8
D. HOFFMAN AS A PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT CASE
To see how the facts in Hoffman might be framed so as to fit within
this new paradigm, consider the following hypothetical: Assume a
franchisor and a prospective franchisee agree to jointly pursue what they
hope to be a profitable project culminating in the establishment of a new
franchise store in a promising location. The parties also agree on the
nature of the initial contribution that each is to make to the enterprise.
The prospective franchisee agrees to search for a new location and to
spend time and efforts in learning how to operate the franchise
successfully, and in liquidating assets sufficient to make up his capital
investment. The franchisor, through the agency of various officers,
implicitly (and indeed explicitly) commits to devote a substantial amount
of internal resources by diverting from other tasks valuable human
capital-the time and efforts of its employees-in order to see whether a
franchise is viable. At this initial stage, however, the ultimate project,
and what each is to do to achieve it, cannot be precisely described.
Important terms such as price and location also cannot be agreed upon.
Nevertheless, the parties agree to proceed with their respective
investments and also agree to negotiate the remaining terms of the
contract once they can observe the fruits of those efforts.
Our two parties have now reached what the law recognizes as a
preliminary agreement. They are unable to write a more complete
contract at the outset because they face many complex and uncertain
81. Schwartz & Scott, supra note to, at 671-73 & n.31.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
83. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note to, at 703-44-
84. See whitford & Macaulay, supra note 23, at 853-55.




conditions. Depending on how those conditions interact, a profitable
franchise operation could take a number of forms, and just which form
would work, if any, is unknown at the start. Notwithstanding the
continuing uncertainty, however, the parties must now make investments
if a successful franchise project is to be achieved. Only by both parties
investing can they determine whether a franchise operation can possibly
succeed. The increased knowledge about the project revealed by their
respective investments, together with increased knowledge of the state of
the world in which a potential franchise must operate, will then permit
the parties to determine whether to finalize the deal with a fully
enforceable contract.
The question is whether and to what extent such an agreement is
legally enforceable. The question is important because the parties meet
as strangers with no necessary prospect of an ongoing relationship, and
as yet there is no mechanism to stimulate the development of trust. Thus,
the risk of opportunism is significant. This is particularly the case where
the parties undertake to invest concurrently. Suppose now that the
franchisor, who has agreed to invest at the same time as the prospective
franchisee, thereafter elects instead to wait and see what comes of the
counterparty's investment. Delaying a promised investment under these
conditions offers several strategic advantages. First, the passage of time
and her partner's investment is likely to reveal whether the project will
be profitable. If so, the delaying party enjoys a strategic advantage in
negotiating the terms of the final agreement. Second, if the project
proves unsuccessful, delay permits the opportunistic party to avoid the
resulting sunk costs. Those savings may well be larger than any offsetting
losses from delayed returns if the project instead proves profitable.
Historically, as I suggest above, preliminary agreements such as this
would be unenforceable under the indefiniteness doctrine of the
common law of contracts.8 Recently, however, a new enforcement rule is
emerging that responds to the increasing importance to successful
86. See Scorr & KRAUS, supra note 6, at 29-41, 299-303.
[T]wo factual patterns typify unenforceable indefinite agreements at common law. The first,
illustrated.. . by Varney v. Ditmars, is the indefinite bonus contract. In Varney, the New
York Court of Appeals held a bonus agreement for "a fair share of the profits" too
indefinite and thus enforceable [sic]. The second archetype is a variation on the first,
extending the common law rule to agreements where essential terms were explicitly left to
further negotiation. For example, in Petze v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co, the New York
appellate court held that an agreement providing that "the method of accounting to
determine the net distributable profits is to be agreed upon later" was unenforceable under
the indefiniteness rule. Common law courts thereafter have consistently held that such
"agreements to agree" are unenforceable so long as any essential term was open to
negotiation.
Id. at 35 (citations omitted) (citing III N.E. 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916); 1o9 N.YS. 328 (App. Div.
1908)).
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contracting of the search for new partners in an uncertain environment.
The new enforcement rule holds that parties to such a preliminary
understanding "accept a mutual commitment to negotiate together in
good faith in an effort to reach final agreement."7 Neither party,
however, has a right to demand performance of the contemplated
transaction.'8 If the parties cannot ultimately agree on a final contract,
they may abandon the deal.
Returning to our hypothetical facts, the franchisor has engaged in
just the strategic behavior that the new rule is designed to discourage: it
delayed processing several of the franchisees' financial statements and
officials seemed to drag their feet on resolving important issues regarding
the necessary financing for a franchise. A court applying the new
doctrine would thus likely find the franchisor to be in breach of a
preliminary agreement to bargain in good faith and would award the
prospective franchisee reliance damages based on his investment
expenditures in investigating locations and selling assets prematurely.
And furthermore, such a decision would support the interests of future
justice: it would motivate future parties to enter such relationships and
make the investments necessary for innovative projects such as this to
succeed. In the absence of a legal rule protecting the franchisee's
investment cost, a rational party in that position would anticipate the risk
of hold-up and would decline to make the efficient investment. Finding
that the parties have reached a preliminary agreement thus legally
commits the franchisor to invest as promised and to reimburse the
franchisee's reliance expenditures if it did not, but it does not commit
either party to negotiate an ultimate deal.
No one can say for sure that Mr. Hoffmann would win a verdict
today if the facts were as we imagined in our hypothetical. But the point
of the demonstration is to show that the rule of a case is as important as
the result. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found a promise on facts that
failed to persuade many readers thereafter that a binding commitment
had, in fact, been made. One of the possible effects of such a rule could
have been for courts to follow the lead of Hoffman and impose
promissory liability for ambiguous statements made by one party during
contract negotiations on which the counterparty relied to her detriment.
In such a case, justice would not have been done to those who thereafter
were deterred from making value enhancing contracts by the threat of
liability during the negotiation process. As it happened, courts did not
follow Hoffman and most such claims failed in other courts.' But this
outcome, too, has generated perverse effects. Justice has not been done
87. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Schwartz & Scott, supra note to, at 671-73 & nl.31.
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to those parties in the intervening years who might well have been able
to recover their reliance losses because their counterparty strategically
breached a preliminary agreement, but who failed to recover because
their case was framed solely on a legal theory that courts have generally
discounted.
CONCLUSION
The two stories of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores offered here can
stand on their own as different views of the Cathedral.9 Readers are free
to prefer one to the other or even to undertake the research that might
further harmonize these two accounts. For me there are several lessons. I
have learned that archeological research of this sort is difficult and that
one should be both more cautious and more modest in making claims
and drawing inferences from complex facts. I have also been reminded of
the inherent bias in legal scholarship toward stories that support our
preexisting methodological commitments. This bias does not rest upon
the claim that most legal scholars have political views that lead them to
prefer governmental to market-based solutions or vice versa. Rather, it is
an observation based upon the political economy of the academic
marketplace. Law professors enhance their importance relative to other
academics in direct relation to the frequency with which the instruments
they deploy can be seen as superior to alternative solutions premised on
a different set of methodological tools."
Whatever the reasons, it is important for legal academics to
appreciate the biases inherent in their adopted disciplines and work to
correct for them. As an applied discipline, law is dependent on the tools
of primary disciplines for both the positive and normative claims that it
makes about real-world phenomena. And thus it is that legal analysts use
either economics or the behavioral sciences to suggest solutions to legal
problems. Economic theory is useful for many purposes and any legal
scholar who purports to make claims about the effects of contract law
rules on contracting parties should have a basic competence in deploying
these techniques. Similarly, the research methodologies of psychology
and sociology used by scholars in the law-and-society tradition are useful
in enriching our understanding of the underlying behaviors that are
regulated by those same rules. By the same token, therefore, familiarity
with particular context is good medicine for any law-and-economics
analyst who strives for general theory.
91. With apologies to Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. Io89 (1972).
92. For a discussion of the political economy of legal academics in the context of private law
reform groups, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Econorny of Private Legislatures,
'43 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).
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